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Come sit at my knee
And talk of poli cy 11

That less than heroic couplet may correspond to the public's view of the
basic relationship between the President of the United States and his Council
of Economic Advisers.

But it hardly describes the reality or complexity of

the role of the CEA.

Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that the

conduct of the CEA in practice often differs substantially from the general
expectation of its performance.

Let us explore some of the reasons why this

situation obtains.
First of all, picture a decision-making process in which a wide and
varying assortment of official and informal groups and individuals provide
advice to the President.

After all, few economic questions are devoid of

political, social, or foreign policy implications, and most non-economic
issues-- domestic and international --contain some significant economic
aspects.
Thus, not many decisions in governmental policymaking are made solely or
even primarily on the basis of economic analysis or information from
economists.

On the other hand, few such decisions are so devoid of economic

premises or consequences that economic expertise is irrelevent.
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Secondly, it should be recognized that whose advice the President follows
at any given time and on any specific issue depends on a large and varying
number of factors.

These range from the desires of the chief executive to the

ability and past relationships of his other advisers to the requirements of
the circumstances.

For example, several CEA chairmen with strong backgrounds

in government regulation participated actively in policymaking in that area,
while others concentrated more on tax matters.
Thirdly, the formation of public policy takes place at many levels.
Interagency committees are constantly meeting, with differing mandates to
develop, recommend, review and, sometimes, approve policy.
basis-- and bane-- of a bureaucrat's existence.

Meetings are the

It is at this level that

many advisory units exert their greatest influence.
These meetings, of course, are not open to the public.

On occasion --

far too numerous for the orderly conduct of government -- a version of the
results is

11

leaked

11

to the press by an interested party.

This garbled report

may come to represent the public's understanding of what has occurred.

I am

reminded of the Japanese movie Rashomon, in which the viewer sees the story
successively from the different viewpoint of each of the participants.
that case, however, they all

11

leaked.

In

11

Fourthly, the public role of the Council of Economic Advisers is normally
the proverbial tip of the iceberg.

Usually, the CEA chairman is expected to

develop public understanding of and thereby enhance the popular support for
the President's economic program.

Yet some of the most successful chairmen

kept the lowest profiles, avoiding speechifying and press conferences.
The notion that CEA chairmen often use the bully pulpit to publicly
educate the President and his administration is a figment of the imagination.
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CEA chainnen have normally conducted their intellectual battles inside
family ...

11

the

Occasionally, a CEA member may get in front of current

administration policy, but that is done with the knowledge that he or she was
walking down a dangerous path, and that any trial balloon launched may easily
be popped.
In effect, there is a trade-off-- between sounding off in public and
being an effective member of the Administration's decision-making process in
private.

Recent experience has underscored the existence of this tradeoff,

although most CEA chairmen have instinctively sensed the nature of the subtle
relationships involved.
The Role of the Chairman
With this extensive introduction, I would now like to present my
understanding of the key aspects of the role and function of the chairman of
the Council of Economic Advisers.

As you may know, a reorganization plan in

1953 lodged all of the authority of the council in the chairman and specified
that he (or she) would be the link to the President.
1.

To advise the President on the course of the economy.

This is the

only statutory function assigned to the Council of Economic Advisers, aside
from the writing of the Economic Report.

A rather vague statement of

authority is contained in the CEA's charter, the Employment Act of 1946.
In addition to sending him a regular flow of analytic reports, the CEA
chairman alerts the President to impending releases of economic news.

Thus,

the evening before the Consumer Price Index report for a given month is
issued, the President has on his desk a memo from the CEA chairman setting
forth the highlights and often suggesting how the White House could respond to
press i nq ui ri es.
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At times the President will call for amplification.

For example,

President Reagan and I had a pleasant-- but spirited and extended -difference of views on the matter of seasonally adjusted versus unadjusted
reports on employment and unemployment.

We ultimately resolved this matter by

my providing him both sets of data, together with suitable caveats.
Of course, the direct contacts with the President are of very special
importance.

Because of the confidential nature of the role of trusted adviser

I will treat this aspect very lightly.

When I joined the Administration, I

decided not to keep a diary or write memoirs.

The opportunity cost seemed too

high in view of the wide array of policymaking activities I was involved in at
the time.

Some of my colleagues in the Administration, with large support

staffs, obviously decided otherwise.
As an example of the advice to the President, I do recall discussing the
subject of gold with him on several occasions, a matter that he himself had
studied at some length over the years.

During the 1980 presidential campaign

and earlier, he had indicated strong interest in restoring the gold standard.
As a member of the Gold Commission (set up under a 1980 law), I told him that
I would pursue the matter with an open mind.
the

majori~

Subsequently, we reported that

of the Commission opposed a return to gold.

That disposed of the

rna tter.
Similarly, I often wound up urging the President and other senior members
of the Administration to keep our disagreements with the Federal Reserve
System within the government.

It became clear, I thought, that financial

markets were reacting badly to almost any Administration statement on monetary
policy that remotely could be considered critical of the Fed.

In any event, I

had frequent opportunities to present our views to Fed chairman Paul Volcker
on a one-to-one basis.

5

These two episodes are examples of the CEA 1 s function of taking advantage
of the opportunity to help the President avoid economic harm.
2.

To participate in top level decision-making on economic, budget, and

financial policy.

Typically, the chairman of the CEA participates in numerous

high level formal (e.g. cabinet) and informal (e.g. budget policy) meetings at
which the President reviews or makes policy decisions.

The effectiveness of

the CEA on any specific issue depends in large part on the cogency of its
analysis.
But that is not always the case.

For example, in 1981, we won the battle

to eliminate import restrictions on shoes, but lost the struggle to contain
restrictions on imports of textiles.

Quite candidly, I did quite a bit of

politicking on these issues, occasionally obtaining aid from cabinet members
that I had supported on other matters.

But I doubt that it was merely

coincidental that the Congressional delegation to the Hhite House which
successfully urged textile quotas was led by a senior southern Republican who
was diligently working for the enactment of the President•s program, while the
unsuccessful shoe delegation was chaired by a prominent Northeastern liberal
Democrat.
The determination of the economic assumptions to be used for making
revenue and expenditure estimates is a key and early aspect of the annual
policy cycle.

In early 1981 especially, as we were fleshing out the details

of Reaganomics, I found myself in recurring battles with both supply-siders
and monetarists.

I still vividly recall the fervor of those doctrinal

disputes, which at times bordered on the theological.

For example, my

insistence that a modest period of recession would accompany the imposition of
monetary restraint was viewed by the supply-siders as a lack of faith in the
instantaneous nature of the economy•s response to the tax cuts.
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I interpreted the ro 1e of the chairman of the CEA not as a means of
preaching supply-side economics or monetarism, but rather of helping the
President develop and carry out his economic program.

Thus, the economic

assumptions we adopted were a compromise which satisfied neither the
monetarists nor the supply-siders.

It is fascinating to note that the more

modest economic scenario that I settled for was simultaneously attacked by
many of the supply-siders as far too pessimistic and by most private
economists as wildly optimistic.

Subsequently, I reported to the President

that I had converted an economic scenario which was "off-the-wall" to one that
\-Ja

11

s merely Way out. "
In the Reagan Administration, the main role of the CEA has not been to

develop additional, brave new programs, but to operate what we called an
economic damage-limitation mechanism.

Thus, the CEA is expected to, and

predictably does, oppose each and every proposal to subsidize some segment of
the economy, or to shield a specific industry from competition.
We did not win all of these battles during my term of office, but each
proponent of additional government involvement in the private sector knew that
he or she would have to do battle.

At times, a Cabinet member proposing some

additional form of government intervention in the economy would start off by
saying,

11

Mr. President, Murray will probably give you a different view,
11

but
3.

To supervise the preparation of the Economic Report.

The President's

economic message, usually written by the CEA, has for many years been quite
short.

The great bulk of the document consists of \tJhat is technically the

Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers.

This is a joint effort of

the three members of the Council and the entire Council staff; at least that
is the procedure that I follawed.
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In the case of the 1982 report, all three members of the Council saw it
as an opportunity to explain the Reagan economic philosophy and program to the
public and to the economics profession.

Although the reaction in the

professional journals was mixed, virtually all commentators concluded that we
succeeded in focusing the central thrust of the Economic Report on
Reaganomics.
The Annual Report also provides some opportunity to raise new issues and
to move policy along.

For example, it was widely known in Washington that I

had advocated making sizeable reductions in the rapidly expanding military
budget.
decades.

This was a subject area in which I had done research for over two
The 1982 Economic Report was, I believe, the first one that raised

serious questions about the economic feasibility of the defense program of the
Administration then in office.
4.

To administer the Council of Economic Advisers.

The work of the CEA

is carried on in an atmosphere of professionalism and, in large measure,
nonpartisanship.

As is customary with a change in administration, I inherited

the staff recruited by my Democratic predecessor.

Except for career

statisticians and secretaries, the staff traditionally consists of non-career
appointees, most of whom are on leave from their respective universities and
research institutes.

I found each one of them a loyal and dedicated

professional economist.

In fact, I asked several of them to stay on beyond

their initial appointments.
Few people outside of Washington appreciate how small the CEA is in
relation to its large mandate.

Its staff of 30-40 includes economists and

statisticians, as well as secretarial and support staff.

In terms of size,

the CEA is dwarfed by the thousands of economists employed in the Departments
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of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and State.

Personally, it hurt to administer

a 12 percent budget cut to what was already the smallest CEA staff in over a
decade.

Nevertheless, as I explained at the time in a speech to the American

Council on Education,

11

the republic will survive and even prosper.

11

The chintzy budget for the CEA makes the chairmanship both intellectually
stimulating and physically grueling.

It did give me an opportunity, however,

to one-up the Hashington press corps on one occasion.

At a joint press

conference with then Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan, we were asked to
comment on the high cost of the government chauffering senior government
officials from their homes to their offices and back.

My response, which

disposed of the rna tter at the time, was that I gave the subject a great deal
of thought on the bus on the way to work that morning!
5.

To participate in international economic policymaking.

important international dimension to economic policy.

There is an

A wide array of

ambassadors and economic and finance ministers from other nations frequently
come by the CEA for discussions ranging from the courtesy call to the
substantive.

The chairman of the CEA carries at times a significant

representational load.

For example, he also serves as chairman of the U.S.

delegation to the Economic Policy Committee of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development.

It is also customary to elect the chairman of

our delegation chairman of the OECD Economic Policy Committee.
This activity provides a good opportunity to work with counterparts in
other nations to develop positions and draft communiques, much of which can
serve as preliminary input to planning for the annual economic summits.

I

found the many informal discussions at OECD meetings helpful in giving the
President an indication of the current thinking on the part of other
countries.
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6.

To serve as an administration spokesman to Congress, the

the public.

n~dia,

and

Following the release of the Reagan Administration's proposed

economic recovery program in 1981, the CEA chairman became one of the three
major

11

Sal esmen .. (a 1ong with the Treasury Secretary and the Budget Director)

for the President's economic program-- aside from the .. number one
communicator .. himself.

There followed an almost endless array of joint and

individual congressional testimonies and press conferences; White House
briefings to the Cabinet, other officials, and numerous visiting interest
groups; and speeches to all sorts of organizations -- business, consumers,
agriculture, ethnic, regional, religious, etc.
It reached a point that, when I was out for a meal and the waiters began
to clear the tables, I automatically got ready to stand up and speak.

As I

had participated in developing the 1981 economic program, I initially felt
very comfortable in carrying out this high-priority presidential assignment of
economic 11 marketi ng...

In 1982, as the gap between the execution of the policy

and its original enunciation widened very substantially, I reduced my public
involvement.

In August 1982, with the prospect of having to defend extended

triple digit deficits, I quietly returned to my academic position.
Conclusions
If there is any dominant characteristic of the Council of Economic
Advisers it is that, on virtually all issues reaching the President, it does
not represent any specific constituency.

Unlike each of the departments and

major agencies, the CEA carries little if any special-interest baggage and
thus it is a good proxy for the public or consumer interest.

In the upper

reaches of any administration, there are few centers of analysis or advocacy
with that substantial amount of detachment.
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The President benefits from the CEA's independent voice, to the extent
that he listens to it.

Surely the need is compelling for high level decision

makers to hear and consider views that avoid easy answers and that pose
difficult problems of choice.
It is hard to ascertain the specific influence that a given Council
of Economic Advisers or its chairman exerts on national policy.

All senior

appointees -- be they Cabinet officers or White House officials -- believe
that their contributions are central, and many of them can be expected to
denigrade the role of others.
shortcoming.

I claim no exception from this mortal

Also, other former CEA chairmen would likely provide very

different viewpoints, based on their respective expectations and experiences.
How much of a successful economic policy (however measured) can be
attributed to the CEA then in office is of course a rna tter of judgment.
the same holds true for less happy economic outcomes.

But

Ideally, we would like

to know the difference between actual economic performance and what would have
occurred in the CEA's absence.

I am not aware of any analytical mechanism

available to accomplish this task, however.

Any outsider inevitably relies on

a sample of impressionistic and anecdotal observations.
I returned to the private sector with no grand lessons.

I came away

grateful for the opportunit¥ to speak my mind and to know that decision makers
in government were listening to at least one economist before making up their
minds.

